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I. INTRODUCTION  
 People could be forgiven for being preoccupied during 
November of 2016. As a result, it wouldn’t be surprising that many 
missed an investor report buried in the doldrums of real estate finance: 
Freddie Mac’s November 2016 Investor Update.1 The report, while 
purporting to be a rather straightforward, if banal, update on the status of 
Freddie Mac’s business, is in actuality much more exciting. The report 
states that there is “significant uncertainty” whether Freddie Mac will 
ever emerge from conservatorship. This comes a mere eight years after 
the U.S. Treasury Department announced that control of the two 
mortgage giants—Fannie Mae (“Fannie”) and Freddie Mac 
(“Freddie”)—would be under the “temporary” conservatorship of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”).2 The November 2016 
Update also quietly explained that the FHFA still assumed all powers of 
governance and management and controlled business activity and 
strategy. Yet, our federal courts have still been slow to recognize the 
obvious wolf marauding in reports like these. Fannie and Freddie are 
state-actors.      
Fannie and Freddie are truly dominant figures in the national housing 
market.3 Collectively, the two entities guarantee roughly 60% of 
mortgages in the United States.4   
 As a result, even in a relatively calm housing market, Fannie and 
Freddie have to collect a significant amount of mortgage debt. From 
2008-2014, of course, the market was not calm. Millions of homeowners 
had their residences foreclosed upon.5 Like most lending agencies, 
Fannie and Freddie utilize agents, known as servicers, to collect debt.6 
                                                          
1 Freddie Mac Update (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf.  
2 Treasury, FHFA Outline Fannie, Freddie Rescue, THE STREET (Sept. 8, 2008), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/10436159/1/treasury-fhfa-outline-fannie-
freddie-rescue.html.  
3 John Ligon & David Muhlhausen, The Role of GSEs in the Housing Market, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/KF9R-QBU9 (stating 
that Fannie and Freddie “hold dominant positions in the U.S. housing market.”). 
4 Jason Lange, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac to Lose Market Share to Private 
Capital: CBO, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2014, 9:23 PM), https://perma.cc/QYN6-
NH2E.  
5 Corelogic, National Foreclosure Report 1, 2 (Mar. 2014), 
https://perma.cc/6QY2-BC2M. 
6 See, e.g., Greater Transparencies and Efficiencies in Guide Bulletin 2015-22, 
FREDDIE MAC (Dec. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/U7KG-GWC8. 
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Issue 1 The Indefinite Conservatorship 13 
However, when a mortgagee becomes delinquent on their mortgage, 
servicers suddenly assume a more impactful role. They are clothed, 
largely, with the decision of whether or not to proceed with a 
foreclosure.7 
 It is in this context that the mechanics of a foreclosure 
proceeding and the applicable governing law becomes crucial. A 
majority of states statutorily permit non-judicial foreclosures,8 which 
allows for foreclosure sales without interference or approval from a 
court—in essence, there is no warning to the delinquent mortgagee.9 The 
problem with these non-judicial proceedings is that they have been found 
to violate Constitutional guarantees of due process for lack of prior 
notice.10 The result is that the millions of mortgagees holding loans 
guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie are at risk of suffering through a 
foreclosure proceeding that abrogates Constitutional procedural 
protections.  
 The raison d’etre of this problem, though, is not just the non-
judicial foreclosure proceedings themselves. The broader issue is the 
status of Fannie and Freddie. As long as the foreclosures initiated by 
Fannie and Freddie are not considered state-action,11 the actions of the 
                                                          
7 Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives 
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 765 (2011) (“Decisions 
about whether to foreclose or modify must be made. The homeowner must be 
contacted. If the house is vacant, it must be secured. The timing of the 
foreclosure must be managed, and ancillary service providers, from title 
companies to attorneys to real estate brokers for a post-foreclosure sale, must be 
hired. All those decisions are left largely to [sic] servicers’ discretion.”). 
8 Id.  
9 See Florence W. Roisman, Protecting Homeowners from Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure of Mortgages Held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 43 REAL EST. 
L.J. 125, 127 (2014) [hereinafter Roisman, Protecting Homeowners].  
10 Id. at 128; see also Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A 
Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. 
REV. 583, 611 (2010) (setting out a list of state cases that found non-judicial 
proceedings violated due process requirements such as fair notice). 
11 I refrain from using a capital “S” in invoking the term state-action. It should 
be noted that the term state-action as used in this article refers to action 
undertaken by either, or both, the federal government and a state government. 
The capitalized version of state can connote a broader, more transcendental view 
of government. This article is not directly invoking that aspect of a State. See 
generally Franz Oppenheimer, DER STAAT (1908), https://perma.cc/P4TD-
XEGH (last visited Nov. 7, 2016 3:24 PM). 
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servicers—and whether or not their foreclosure proceedings violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment—is not a cognizable claim.12  
 Thus, the threshold question is whether mortgages foreclosed on 
by servicers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac constitutes state-action. 
This article resolves that question in the affirmative.   
 Part I gives an overview of the state-action doctrine, particularly 
three specific tests that courts have used in articulating what constitutes 
state-action. Part II argues that the courts to have passed on the issue at 
hand, especially the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia in Herron v. Fannie Mae,13 made a series of errors that 
materially affected the state-action analysis. Part III sets out how 
correcting these errors provides a much stronger basis for viewing the 
conservatorships of both Fannie and Freddie as state-action. The 
Conclusion describes the consequences that would flow from labeling 
the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie state-action. 
II. HOW FANNIE AND FREDDIE ESCAPED THE REACH OF THE 
STATE-ACTION DOCTRINE 
 This Part argues that the state-action doctrine developed in order 
to effectuate the Constitutional prerogative to bind government, not 
individuals. This Part then discusses a few tests, among several others, 
used by courts to determine whether an ostensibly private activity 
constitutes state-action. Finally, this Part will describe how Fannie and 
Freddie, both pre and post conservatorship, have been deemed by courts 
to not be engaged in state-action.  
A.  How the State-Action Doctrine Developed to 
Protect Private Activity 
 The classical rendition of the state-action doctrine usually begins 
with Justice Bradley’s pronouncement in the Civil Rights Cases that 
“civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State 
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, 
unsupported by State authority . . . .”14 
 However, the state-action doctrine has deeper roots. The Bill of 
Rights is framed in terms of negative liberties, “freedom from, not 
                                                          
12 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); see also discussion infra Part 
II.A. 
13 857 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2012).  
14 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). 
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Issue 1 The Indefinite Conservatorship 15 
freedom to . . . social and political evils, including arbitrary government 
power.”15 For example, the First Amendment states that “Congress shall 
make no law . . .”16 and the Second Amendment concludes with, “the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”17 The 
Constitution seeks to constrain the government based on the principal 
concern that an unrestrained federal government would infringe upon 
natural liberties held by the ultimate sovereign, the body politic, itself 
composed of individual citizens.18 Individual citizens and natural 
liberties also lie at the heart of Constitutional structural protections—a 
view embodied by our Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.19 “State 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.’”20 The Bill of Rights and principles of federalism, secured by the 
structure of our government, require that “[the courts] restrain 
government action, not that of private persons.”21 It is this conception of 
natural liberties, and the subsequent necessary limits on federal power,22 
that motivates the state-action doctrine. “Careful adherence to the state-
action requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting 
the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.”23   
                                                          
15 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2635 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).  
18 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“It is of great importance in a 
republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to 
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”). Madison’s 
argument is that negative liberty fosters a stronger republican democracy. See 
REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS, JAMES MADISON (1800) 
https://perma.cc/8EP7-6YP9 (“The People, not the Government, possess the 
absolute sovereignty.”). 
19 That is, the Bill of Rights is not the only mechanism by which natural liberties 
are secured against government interference. The structural design of the 
government, embodied by federalism and separation of power principles, also 
fastens these rights. 
20 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citing Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
21 Columbia Br. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973). 
͒  
22 For but one recent example. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (stating that the Necessary and Proper clause cannot 
uphold an act when the expansion of federal power is not “proper.”).  
23 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).  
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 The core question of the state-action doctrine is whether private 
conduct can be sufficiently attributable to the state.24 In practice, the 
analysis is a fact-bound inquiry.25 Certain parameters are outlined next.26 
How these tests are applied to Fannie and Freddie is discussed thereafter.  
 Coerciveness. The state can be held responsible for a private 
decision when it has exercised coercive power (or enough 
encouragement) that the course of action is effectively the state’s 
action.27 Coercion, however, is not acquiescence. The latter usually does 
not suffice to transform private action into state-action.28 With respect to 
regulations, the Court has held that “regulations themselves do not 
dictate the decision[s]” in particular situations.29  
 Joint Participation. Joint participation, alternatively labeled 
symbiotic relationship, exists, for example, when a private lessee leases 
space for a restaurant from a state parking authority in a publicly owned 
building, and then racially discriminates between customers who can and 
cannot use the lot.30 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,31 the 
Court held that the state and the restaurant were effectively joint 
participants in the enterprise.   
 Joint participation also exists when a private actor receives a 
benefit from the state (without which it could not act) and in return the 
state receives a benefit from the private actor.32 Burton has arguably been 
narrowed by the proposition that the alleged state-action must be in an 
area where the state, absent the private conduct, would otherwise act.33 
                                                          
24 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 351 (1974). 
25 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 (1982). 
26 These parameters are not clearly defined in the case law, but this article will 
utilize one helpful grouping articulated by Justice O’Connor. See Brentwood 
Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 292 (2001) 
(discussing how state-action can arise when the federal government exercises 
“coercive power,” is in a “joint activity” with the private entity or is otherwise 
“entwined” with the private entity).  
27 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).  
28 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978); Jackson, 419 U.S. 
at 357. 
29 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010. 
30 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961). 
31 Id. 
32 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (describing a 
symbiotic relationship as one where the private party receives a benefit from the 
state in return for carrying out a public function). 
33 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (stating that a private action can be state action if 
it is in an area “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State”).  
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Issue 1 The Indefinite Conservatorship 17 
Thus, if the private conduct exists in an area where the state would not 
otherwise act, state-action is not satisfied.34  
 Entwinement. Courts have also sometimes looked to whether an 
ostensibly private entity and the state are sufficiently entwined. One 
articulation of the test asks whether the private actor is “entwined with 
governmental policies” or whether the government is “entwined in [its] 
management or control.”35  
 This test has several dimensions. One form of entwinement, 
quite obviously, occurs when the state creates and controls an agency. 
For example, in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of 
Philadelphia,36 the Court held the privately endowed Girard College to 
be a state actor, and that enforcement of its discriminatory admissions 
policy was “attributable to the state because . . . the college's board of 
directors was a state agency established by state law.”37 
 The entwinement test becomes muddied when the federal 
government is entangled with a private enterprise in some respects but 
not all. In Evans v. Newton, “private trustees to whom a city had 
transferred a park were state-actors barred from enforcing racial 
segregation, since the park served the public purpose of providing 
community recreation, and the municipality remained entwined in its 
management and control.” 38 
 In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,39 the 
Court held that Amtrak was a state-actor for constitutional purposes. 
Regardless of its congressional designation as private, it was organized 
under federal law to attain governmental objectives and was directed and 
controlled by federal appointees.  
 Lebron has two aspects, both of which will prove important to 
the analysis herein. First, the Court examined the purpose of Amtrak, 
concluding that the corporation was formed explicitly in furtherance of 
the federal government’s goals.40 Second, the Court examined the degree 
to which the federal government controlled Amtrak. In finding that the 
government retained a heavy degree of control, including the ability to 
                                                          
34 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011. 
35 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301 (1966). 
36 353 U.S. 230 (1957). 
37 Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 
296-97 (2001) (citing Pennsylvania, 353 U.S. at 231 (1957)). 
38 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296-97 (citing Evans, 382 U.S. at 296).  
39 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
40 Id. at 397. 
7
Goldman: The Indefinite Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is S
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law,
 
 
18 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 17 
appoint a majority of the directors, the Court concluded that Amtrak was 
under the permanent control of the federal government.41 
B.  Pre-Conservatorship: Fannie & Freddie Not 
Engaged in State-Action  
  Fannie was created in 1968 when Congress partitioned the 
Federal National Mortgage Association into two entities, Fannie (a 
private corporation) and Ginnie Mae (a government entity).42 Fannie was 
empowered to purchase, sell, and service mortgages43 and was privately 
controlled by a board of directors, the majority of whom were elected 
annually by the shareholders.44  
 Congress created Freddie in 1970, and in 1989, under the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
(“FIRREA”), Congress privatized Freddie.45 
 The primary activity of Fannie and Freddie is to promote quality, 
affordable housing by: “(a) purchasing qualifying residential loans from 
mortgage originators to increase home finance market liquidity, and (b) 
providing capital support to multifamily housing projects.”46 Fannie and 
Freddie, also called government sponsored entities or “GSEs,” purchase 
mortgages from originators, creating a secondary market in mortgages 
(fueled by the creation of mortgage-backed securities).47 The secondary 
market sale of mortgages, by shifting risk, allows capital to be freed for 
the purpose of originating more mortgages, where the process then 
repeats itself.48 The GSEs were particularly vital cogs in the mortgage 
marketplace because they were viewed as implicitly supported by the 
                                                          
41 Id. 
42 Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2012). 
43 See 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(1964).  
44 See 12 U.S.C. § 1718(a)(2006) (establishing common stock with the right to 
vote for directors and preferred stock on terms and conditions as prescribed by 
such directors); see also Herron, 857 F. Supp. at 89-90. 
45 Roisman, Protecting Homeowners, supra note 7, at 130-38. 
46 Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role 
and Control of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1495 
(2011). 
47 See Basics of Fannie Mae Single-Family MBS 1, 1 (Aug. 5, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/N4CU-NGHM; see also Freddie Mac, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, 
https://perma.cc/2C5S-U2AB.  
48 See Boyack supra note 45, at 1495. 
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Issue 1 The Indefinite Conservatorship 19 
“full faith and credit” of the United States.49 As a result, the GSEs could 
borrow at lower rates and secure strong credit ratings.50  
 The court system viewed both Fannie and Freddie as private 
actors engaged in private activity. In Roberts v. Cameron-Brown,51 the 
Fifth Circuit invoked the entwinement test to conclude that the state and 
Fannie were not so entangled as to trigger state-action. The court 
compared Fannie to a “privately-owned mortgage banker providing 
secondary mortgage loans,” and described the structure of Fannie as 
resembling the capital structure of a privately owned corporation.52 The 
Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion.53 
 Freddie was also deemed to not be a state-actor, but the analysis 
was more sanguine. First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Freddie in 
fact satisfied the first prong of the Lebron test. That is, “Freddie Mac's 
purposes are federal governmental objectives.”54 Nevertheless, the court 
found that Freddie was not a state-actor because it was not “controlled” 
by the federal government, thus failing the second part of Lebron’s 
conjunctive test: 
 
Freddie Mac's board of directors consists of 18 
persons, of whom 13 are elected annually by the 
voting common shareholders. Freddie Mac has 
apparently issued nearly 60 million common 
shares of stock, and its shares are publicly traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange. Amtrak, by 
contrast, had only four private shareholders at 
the time Lebron was decided. Freddie Mac's five 
remaining directors are appointed annually by 
the President, independently of the Senate. Thus, 
the U.S. government is entitled to appoint less 
than one-third of Freddie Mac's directors.55  
 
                                                          
49 SELDEN BIGGS & LEILA B. HELMS, THE PRACTICE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
POLICY-MAKING 209 (Routledge, 2006). 
50 Boyack, supra note 45, at 1495.  
51 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977). 
52 Id. at 359. 
53 See Northrip v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 31 (6th Cir. 1975). 
54 Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 
1407 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
55 Id. (citation omitted). 
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The court continued its comparison of Freddie with Amtrak, pointing out 
that the federal government unanimously handpicked Amtrak’s board, 
whereas the board of Freddie was, to a degree, influenced by the 
shareholders of privately owned common stock.56 
C.  Post-Conservatorship: Fannie & Freddie Still Not 
Engaged in State-Action 
 In 2008, Fannie and Freddie faced intense liquidity pressure due 
to the dwindling value of homes and the skyrocketing foreclosure rate.57 
In response, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act,58 effective July 30, 2008.59 The Federal Housing Finance Authority 
(“FHRA”), created under HERA, was given “general regulatory 
authority”60 over Fannie and Freddie at the discretion of the Director of 
the FHFA.61 This authority included the ability for the Director to 
appoint the FHFA as conservator or receiver.62  
 The FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship on 
September 7, 2008.63 The FHFA is authorized to appoint the board of 
both entities,64 as well as to: 
 
(i) take over the assets of and operate the 
regulated entity with all the powers of the 
shareholders, the directors, and the officers of 
the regulated entity and conduct all business of 
the regulated entity; (ii) collect all obligations 
and money due the regulated entity; (iii) perform 
all functions of the regulated entity in the name 
of the regulated entity which are consistent with 
the appointment as conservator or receiver; (iv) 
                                                          
56 See id.  
57 See Federal Reserve Programs To Strengthen Credit Markets & the Economy: 
Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., (Feb. 10, 2009) 
https://perma.cc/Z5H9-NJLU, (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, chairman, Federal 
Reserve) 
58 The Housing & Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et. seq. 
(2008) [hereinafter HERA]; see also supra note 2 and accompanying discussion. 
59 Roisman, Protecting Homeowners, supra note 7, at 130-38. 
60 See supra note 2 and accompanying discussion. 
61 See supra note 2 and accompanying discussion.  
62 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2008). 
63 Roisman, Protecting Homeowners, supra note 7, at 135.  
64 See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(d) (2008). 
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preserve and conserve the assets and property of 
the regulated entity; and (v) provide by contract 
for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, 
action, or duty of the Agency as conservator or 
receiver.65 
 
The FHFA used many of the powers afforded to it. The FHFA as 
conservator “reconstituted Fannie Mae's Board of Directors,”66 sold up to 
$100 billion of its stock to the treasury, and sold up to $1.25 trillion of 
mortgage-backed securities to the Federal Reserve.67 
 This article argues that the conservatorship of Fannie and 
Freddie renders the activities of these entities state-action. Yet, a few 
federal courts have wrongly rejected this argument in favor of 
maintaining the pre-conservatorship (no state-action) status quo.68 
 The most prominent case is Herron v. Fannie Mae, where a 
federal district court closely considered whether post-conservatorship 
Fannie resembled Amtrak enough for it to be considered a state-actor. 69 
Ultimately, the court concluded no. Specifically, the court stated that 
Fannie would be a state-actor if the government retained “permanent 
authority” to appoint a majority of the corporation's directors. To the 
contrary, the court ruled, the appointment of FHFA as conservator did 
not establish permanent government authority to control Fannie.70  
 The court made three notable moves. First, it separated the 
concept of conservatorship from control.71 Second, the court found that 
although the FHFA was in control of Fannie, it was only on a temporary 
basis, insofar as “conservatorship is by nature temporary.”72 Thus, the 
requirement of permanency was not met. Finally, the court found that the 
                                                          
65 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2008). 
66 Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D.D.C. 2012). 
67 Roisman, Protecting Homeowners, supra note 7, at 135. 
68 See, e.g., Meridian Inv., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2016 WL 
795454, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2016) (rejecting argument that Freddie Mac is a 
state-actor); Rubin v. Fannie Mae, 587 F. App'x 273, 275 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(rejecting argument that Fannie Mae is a state-actor); Mik v. Federal Home 
Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 168 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that 
Freddie Mac is a state-actor); Syriani v. Freddie Mac Multiclass Certificates, 
Series 3365, 2012 WL 6200251, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2012)(rejecting 
argument that Freddie Mac is a stat-actor). 
69 Herron, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
70 Id. at 95 (internal citation omitted). 
71 See id. at 96. 
72 Id.  
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agreements between Fannie and the FHFA either expressly or implicitly 
maintained Fannie’s status as an entity distinct from the government. 
Underlying the court’s analysis was the idea that a conservator or 
receiver steps into the shoes of the private entity—it assumes the private 
status of the entity.73  
 The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion, albeit with 
significantly less discussion of the issue.74 In failing to recognize that 
Fannie Mae was a state-actor, the court relied quite heavily on the idea 
that “[u]nder HERA Congress empowered the FHFA to become 
conservator for Fannie Mae for the limited purpose of reorganizing, 
rehabilitating, or winding up [its] affairs. This, the court found, is an 
inherently “temporary” purpose.75 
 One state appellate court in Michigan found that Fannie, in its 
post-conservatorship form, was a state-actor. The key for the court was 
its obligation to sift through perfunctory labels in order to determine 
Fannie’s status in fact. Though the court wrote that the conservatorship 
was described as temporary, “the procedures and provisions in place 
made the conservatorship, in all practicality, permanent.” 76 
 In March 2015, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in 
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads,77 
and included dicta that seemingly changed the framework for 
understanding Lebron. The Court stated that instead of relying on 
Congressional labels to determine an entity’s status, courts should 
scrutinize the “practical reality” of an entity’s status.78 This clarification 
of Lebron comports closely with the Michigan Court of Appeals’ 
analysis in Kelley—and requires a close look at whether, in their current 
conservatorship state, Fannie and Freddie are indeed engaged in state-
action. 
                                                          
73 See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) (quoting 
Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 585 
(1989)); accord Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); accord United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 68 (5th Cir. 1994).  
74 See Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 168 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(finding that Freddie Mac is not a state actor but relying on pre-conservatorship 
holdings).  
75 See Rubin v. Fannie Mae, 587 F. App'x 273, 275 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 12 
U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2)(2008)). 
76 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Kelley, No. 12000885AV, 2013 WL 
3812051, at *5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2013). 
77 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) 
78 Dep't of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1233. 
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III.  FANNIE AND FREDDIE ARE UNDER INDEFINITE 
CONSERVATORSHIP 
 This part argues in Section A that in relation to Fannie and 
Freddie, courts have been slipshod in distinguishing between 
receivership and conservatorship. The Herron court was particularly 
guilty of this. Section B argues that the conservatorship is not temporary; 
the reality is quite the opposite—the conservatorships of Fannie and 
Freddie are indefinite. This dispels the incorrect notion, furthered by the 
Herron decision, that the conservatorships are merely temporary. As a 
result of being shuttered in indefinite conservatorships under the guise of 
the FHFA, Fannie and Freddie are engaged in state-action.  
A. The First Problem with Herron: Conservatorship, 
Not Receivership 
 Herron conflated the distinct notions of conservatorship and 
receivership, without digging deeper to determine which relationship 
actually existed between the FHFA, Fannie and Freddie. This is vital. 
Conservatorship and receivership differ in material ways, and the 
differences amount to separate and unique legal treatment. As detailed 
below, a company under the receivership of the federal government is 
much less likely to be engaged in state-action, whereas a company under 
the conservatorship of the federal government is more likely to tread in 
state-action.  
 This section proceeds by first examining the differences between 
receivership and conservatorship. This section then argues that Congress 
specifically recognized the differences between conservatorship and 
receivership, but the Herron court failed to distinguish between the two. 
This led the court to the incorrect conclusion that Fannie was not 
engaged in state-action. In fact, Fannie and Freddie are in 
conservatorship, and as a result are engaged in state-action. 
i. Receivership: Designed for an Orderly 
Liquidation 
 Receivership is designed to preserve a company’s assets, for the 
benefit of creditors, in the face of bankruptcy.79 For example, the FDIC 
                                                          
79 See Receivership Management Program, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. 
(May 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/DLR4-NXJT (“[FDIC] assumes responsibility 
for efficiently recovering the maximum amount possible from the disposition of 
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often acts as a receiver— typically, the FDIC is appointed by a court as a 
receiver for an insured depository institution.80 In such situations, the 
FDIC is charged with “the disposition of the receivership’s assets and . . . 
resolv[ing] all obligations, claims, and other legal impediments . . . .”81 
In O'Melveny, the Court found that receivership places the FDIC “in the 
shoes” of the insolvent company.82 
 This legal characterization of receivership comports with the 
fiduciary duties that receivership carries. A receiver has fiduciary 
obligations to its stakeholders and the court.83 Fiduciary duties run to the 
court due to the fact that the court appoints the receiver.  
 Stakeholders for this purpose constitute defrauded investors, 
claimants and creditors.84 Although fiduciary duties do not typically run 
to creditors, the Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized that during a 
period of “actual insolvency,” a corporation owes to creditors the same 
fiduciary duties that it typically owes to shareholders.85  
 In this vein, the legal understanding of receivership is closely 
tied to the direction of fiduciary duties. In receivership, the receiver owes 
fiduciary duties to the creditors, which the corporation would otherwise 
owe to creditors during a period of insolvency. In this sense, as the Court 
accurately stated, the receiver “steps into the shoes” of the private entity, 
and assumes the typical menu of fiduciary obligations.86  
                                                                                                                                  
the receivership’s assets and the pursuit of the receivership’s claims.”) 
80 See id. (“[W]hen an insured depository institution fails, the FDIC is ordinarily 
appointed receiver.”). 
81 Id.  
82 O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).  
83 SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: 10 THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT RECEIVERS, (Aug. 27, 
2015), https://perma.cc/ZRL5-3FL8 (“[a] receiver has a fiduciary duty to 
stakeholders and the court, and typically has the discretion to marshal, manage 
and liquidate the receivership company’s assets, while accounting for all 
receipts and payments.”). 
84 See id. (“A receiver’s powers generally include . . . distributing assets to 
defrauded investors, claimants or creditors through a court-approved plan.”).  
85 See Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 176 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (citing N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92, at 100 (Del. 2007)) (“The fiduciary duties that creditors gain 
derivative standing to enforce are not special duties to creditors, but rather the 
fiduciary duties that directors owe to the corporation to maximize its value for 
the benefit of all residual claimants.”); See also N. Am. Catholic Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc., 930 A.2d at 103 (stating that during 
insolvency,“[c]reditors may . . . protect their interest by bringing derivative 
claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation.”). 
86 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87.  
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ii. Conservatorship: Designed for Returning a 
Company to Business 
 Conservatorship functions in a different manner. Critically, it is 
not limited to bankruptcy, unlike receivership. Rather, as stated by the 
FHFA, conservatorship is: 
 
[T]he legal process [for entities that are not eligible for 
Bankruptcy court reorganization] in which a person or 
entity is appointed to establish control and oversight of a 
company to put it in a sound and solvent condition. In a 
conservatorship, the powers of the Company’s directors, 
officers, and shareholders are transferred to the 
designated Conservator.87  
  
In this sense, the starting point for conservatorship and receivership 
differ. Receivership is a court-oriented mechanism to provide for 
protection of a company’s assets during or prior to liquidation; 
conservatorship is a broader notion that has at its center a company’s 
“sound and solvent condition.”88 Conservatorship is instituted in order to 
return a company back to financial health; receivership’s mandate is 
exactly the opposite—to provide for an orderly and deliberate 
liquidation.89 
 The endpoint of conservatorship also differs from the endpoint 
of receivership. In receivership, once the FDIC has completed the 
disposition of the receivership’s assets and has resolved all obligations, 
claims, and other legal impediments, the receivership is terminated.90  
 In contrast, conservatorship has no inherent duration.91 The 
organic statute or order creating the conservatorship defines its goals, 
operations, and conditions for existence, “differing from the FDIC 
                                                          
87 Questions & Answers on Conservatorship, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE 
AGENCY FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, https://perma.cc/7GB9-2YVL. 
88 See William Isaac & Sen. Bob Kerry, How the Fannie and Freddie 
Conservatorship Has Undermined the Resolution Process, INVESTORS UNITE 1, 
3 (2015), https://perma.cc/7L2G-YZFB. 
89 Id. at 3-4. 
90 See Receivership Management Program, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. 
(May 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/8L8E-VHHB. 
91 Frequently Asked Questions, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/UMN8-QW4N. 
15
Goldman: The Indefinite Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is S
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law,
 
 
26 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 17 
receivership context, which does not anticipate a return to business.”92 
Thus, conservatorship is an open-ended relationship, not tethered to 
strictly financial goals. Receivership more narrowly addresses liquidation 
protection, and the receivership dissolves when this goal is 
accomplished.  
 While a receiver “steps into the shoes” of a company and 
assumes its fiduciary obligations to the company’s shareholders, a 
conservator has a more complicated relationship to the underlying 
company’s fiduciary duties. In the case of Fannie and Freddie, the 
federal government had effective control of 79.9% of the common stock 
in both entities.93 This overwhelming stake in both Fannie and Freddie 
rendered the government essentially94 a “dominant shareholder.”95 
Dominant shareholders are widely recognized to have fiduciary duties 
running to the corporation, unlike to creditors, as is the case for the 
receiver.96 
 In this sense, the fiduciary obligations of receivers and 
conservators diverge sharply. Receivers have fiduciary obligations as if 
they are the corporation themselves.97 Conservators owe fiduciary duties 
to the corporation, which is critically distinct from stepping into the 
“shoes” of the company itself.98 This difference recognizes that Fannie 
                                                          
92 Id.  
93 Steven D. Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the 
Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371, 382 (2015).  
94 While the government has not yet exercised its warrant to purchase 79.9% of 
the common stock, this option still gives the government effective control over 
the GSEs, especially with its control of the board of director. See Corwin v. 
KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015) (stating that a 
stockholder is deemed to have effective control if it has control of management 
and potent voting power).  
95 Although there is dispute over whether smaller ownership percentages 
constitute a controlling shareholder, see In re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders 
Litigation, No. CV 7393-VCN, 2014 WL 6735457, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 
2014), 79.9% renders the federal government an in-fact controlling shareholder. 
96 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 
1994) (“[a] controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a 
transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving its 
entire fairness.”) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 
1983)). 
97 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4617 (West 2008). 
98 The doctrine of conservatorship was left unaddressed in O’Melveny. The 
Court narrowly focused on the FDIC’s position as a receiver. See O'Melveny & 
Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) (noting that FDIC as the receiver 
stepped into the shoes of the failed savings and loan).  
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and Freddie are engaged in state-action because they are effectively 
agents of the FHFA. By contrast, receivership does not support an 
agency argument because there is only one entity; in conservatorship 
there are two. 
iii. HERA’s Deliberate Wording  
 The distinction between receivership and conservatorship was 
recognized when Congress passed HERA, which granted the FHFA the 
requisite statutory authority to manage the affairs of Fannie and 
Freddie.99 
 12 U.S.C. § 4617, which governs the FHFA’s authority over 
Fannie and Freddie, explicitly provides that, “the Director [of the FHFA] 
may appoint the Agency as conservator or receiver for a regulated 
entity.”100 The statute also provides for a situation where receivership, 
not conservatorship, would be mandatory—if the Director found Fannie 
or Freddie, or both, to be insolvent or unable to meet obligations as they 
come due.101  
 It is widely recognized that the word “or” creates alternatives.102 
Thus, a plain reading of the statute evidences that Congress intended 
conservatorship as an alternative (not as a substitute) for receivership.103  
 There is further support for this proposition. When Congress 
drafted HERA, it used the language of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(“FDIA”) as a model.104 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (FDIA) and 12 U.S.C. § 
4617(b) (HERA) utilize vastly similar language, subsections, and 
headings.105 The FDIA explicitly provides mechanisms for the FDIC to 
act as a receiver or conservator; once again, the two terms were designed 
                                                          
99 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4617 (West 2008).  
100 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 4617(a)(1)(West 2008); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(1)(2012) 
(emphasis added).  
101 See § 4617(a)(4); see also Michael Krimminger & Mark Calabria, The 
Conservatorships of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac: Actions Violate HERA & 
Established Insolvency Principles, CATO INST. 2, 22 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/LSU2-B27M. 
102 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 116 (2012). 
103 See id.  
104 See Krimminger & Calabria, supra note 99, at 19. The FDIA grants the FDIC 
authority to act as a receiver or a conservator for failed depository institutions. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2013). Thus, the FDIA made sense conceptually as 
language that Congress would want to replicate in HERA. 
105 See Krimminger & Calabria, supra note 99, at 19. 
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and understood as alternatives, not substitutes.106 These similarities bear 
on the meaning and understanding of HERA’s text—statutes in pari 
materia are to be interpreted together.107  
 It seems clear that HERA intended to maintain two distinct 
options for the FHFA: to take the GSEs under conservatorship or 
receivership if needed. This was the “bazooka” that Secretary Paulson 
was referring to,108 and it was predicated off of the same authority that 
the FDIC had over failed banks. This also shows, of course, that 
conservatorship and receivership were not meant to be interchangeable 
provisions in HERA.  
iv. Herron’s Shortcomings 
 Despite the manifest differences between conservatorship and 
receivership in HERA, the Herron court overlooks these distinctions and 
conflates the two terms to give the impression that the state-action 
question comes out the same regardless of whether the FHFA is a 
receiver or a conservator of Fannie and Freddie. Yet, the result differs 
materially.  
 In attempting to analogize the FHFA’s authority over Fannie to 
the FDIC’s authority as a receiver over failed banks, the court wrote that, 
“[t]hus, like [the] FDIC when it serves as a conservator or receiver of a 
private entity, [the] FHFA when it serves as conservator step[s] into the 
shoes of the private corporation, Fannie Mae.”109  
 The court is playing fast and loose with “receivership” and 
“conservatorship.” Recall that the case announcing the “steps into the 
shoes” metaphor, O'Melveny & Myers, dealt with a situation where the 
FDIC acted as a receiver of a failed savings and loan institution.110 In 
O'Melveny, the Court interpreted §1821(d)(2)(A)(i)—which gives the 
FDIC authority to act as a receiver of failed institutions—to stand for the 
proposition that when the FDIC does flex its receivership muscles, it 
steps “into the shoes” of the private company.111 
                                                          
106 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2012).  
107 Scalia & Garner, supra note 100, at 252 (2012). 
108 See Chris Isidore, Paulson in Hot Seat over Fannie, Freddie, CNNMONEY 
(July 15, 2008) https://perma.cc/5HYZ-9QVV (“If you have a bazooka in your 
pocket and people know it, you probably won't have to take it out.”). 
109 Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87, 94 (D.D.C. 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
110 O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) 
111 See id. (“[S]ection 1821(d)(2)(A)(i), . . . appears to indicate that the FDIC as 
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 Herron’s analogy, of course, falls one step short, as it deals with 
a situation where the FHFA acts as a conservator, not as a receiver, of 
Fannie. This was deliberate ordering; conservatorship was not intended 
as a substitute of receivership.112 Thus, the court’s commingling of the 
two terms leads the analogy astray and renders the reliance on O'Melveny 
woefully inadequate. As if recognizing this difficulty without wanting to 
admit it, the court inserts “or receivership” in numerous places after the 
word “conservatorship” when describing the FHFA’s relationship with 
Fannie, such as 
 
The conservator or receiver takes over the day-
to-day operations . . . [t]he purpose of the 
conservator or receiver is to restore the entity to 
fiscal feasibility or to liquidate . . . [t]he 
conservator or receiver steps into the private 
status of the entity . . . when the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) takes over as 
conservator or receiver for a failed bank, it 
obtains the rights and powers of the bank's 
shareholders, officers, and directors. 113 
 
However, the FHFA’s role with Fannie was decidedly clear—the FHFA 
was using its power as a conservator to return Fannie to a safe and 
solvent condition.114 It was not a receiver.   
 Subsequent cases in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia (on issues unrelated to the state-action doctrine) 
have rightfully recognized the distinction between conservatorship and 
receivership as applied to Fannie and Freddie, and the fact that both 
entities are under the conservatorship, not receivership, of the FHFA.115  
                                                                                                                                  
receiver ‘steps into the shoes’ of the failed S & L.”). 
112 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
113 See Herron, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 93-94 (emphasis added). There are several 
further examples. Although the argument is often made, by analogy, that the 
FDIC assumes to the same powers whether appointed as a receiver or 
conservator, this generalized statement is misleading. The powers of the FDIC 
as a conservator differ from powers granted to it when acting as a receiver. See 
Insurance Funds 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2)(D)(i)(West 2013). 
114 See Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Treasury Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the 
Treasury, Statement on Treasury and FHFA Action to Protect Fin. Mkts. & 
Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), https://perma.cc/L89X-8CC9 
115 See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 227 (D.D.C. 2014) (the 
“FHFA has acted within its broad statutory authority as a conservator.”).  
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 It is clear that Fannie and Freddie are in conservatorship, a fact 
that the Herron court failed to make clear. Nevertheless, a further 
question arises: are the conservatorships merely temporary, as Herron 
alleges? 
B. The Second Problem: The Conservatorships are 
Indefinite, Not Temporary 
 This Section sets out the second problem in Herron—the court’s 
mistaken labeling of the relationship between Fannie, Freddie and the 
FHFA as “temporary.” This part argues that the conservatorship is 
indefinite, and as a result Fannie and Freddie are engaged in state-action. 
 Lebron stated that a corporation, in order to be a state-actor, 
must (i) be created in order to further governmental objectives, and (ii) 
under the permanent control and authority of the government.116 It is the 
second prong of this conjunctive test that Herron rightfully focuses on117 
but it errs in its conclusory characterization of the relationship as a mere 
“temporary” one.  
 The misstep occurs when the Herron opinion equates 
conservatorship with temporariness. Specifically, the court asserts that 
although the duration of the conservatorship is indefinite, the FHFA's 
control over Fannie Mae is temporary.118 
 It is not exactly clear how a relationship that is indefinite, as 
Herron admits, can also be temporary, especially in light of the levers of 
control that the FHFA exerts over the GSEs.119 In fact, from birth and 
onwards, the understanding between Fannie, Freddie, and the FHFA was 
that the conservatorship was not temporary. In the first Form 8-K120 filed 
after the conservatorship had commenced, the 8-K specified that “[t]he 
delegation of authority [would] remain in effect until modified or 
                                                          
116 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). 
117 Herron implicitly assumed that the first part of the test, whether the 
corporation was formed in order to further governmental objectives, was clearly 
satisfied. Cf. Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2012) (focusing 
the legal analysis only on the second part of the test). 
118 Id. at 95.  
119 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
120 A Form 8-K is required, pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, when a business transaction that would be of note to investors takes place. 
See Sample, Form 8-K, SEC, https://perma.cc/B8L4-B7RQ. 
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rescinded by FHFA, as conservator.121 Additionally, the document 
asserted, “[the] conservatorship has no specified termination date.”122  
 At the very least, there has been an understanding, admitted by 
the FHFA itself, that the conservatorship is no longer temporary, even if 
it originally endeavored to be so.123 The Inspector General for the FHFA 
stated that is has become “obvious” that the conservatorships are not 
temporary measures.124 Buttressing this point, the FHFA states on its 
own website that, in evident opposition to the very essence of 
conservatorship,  “[t]here is no inherent duration in a conservatorship.125 
 Thus, there is a serious problem with Herron’s blanket statement 
that it is clear that the relationship is temporary. But there is also an issue 
with the subtext of Herron’s argument: namely, that conservatorship 
implies temporariness. The facts on the ground quite clearly point to an 
opposite conclusion; in this case, the conservatorship of Fannie and 
Freddie implies permanence. Despite the fact that Fannie and Freddie 
have paid back their original loans, the federal government altered the 
terms of the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement in 2012.126 The effect 
of the amendment was to sweep 100% of the GSEs’ profits into the 
Treasury’s general account.127 This action has been dubbed “perpetual 
conservatorship.”128 
 This point becomes stark when considering that the 
conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie was an extraordinary event, 
                                                          
121 See Fannie Mae, Form 8–K filed with the SEC at 2 (Dec. 24, 2008), 
https://perma.cc/89H9-AK3W (showing that conservatorship of Fannie Mae has 
no specified termination date). 
122 Id. (emphasis added). 
123 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Office of the Inspector Gen., Enterprise Reform, 2, 
5 https://perma.cc/3EDX-CYXX (stating that it has become “more obvious that 
the conservatorships would not be temporary") 
124 Id. 
125 Frequently Asked Questions, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 89.  
126 See FHFA Office of the Inspector Gen., Analysis of the 2012 Amendments to 
the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, 1 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/WZC2-4HLJ (“On August 17, 2012, Treasury and the . . . 
[]FHFA[], acting as the Enterprises’ conservator, amended the PSPAs 2012 
Amendments.”)  
127 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Acting Dir. Edward J. 
DeMarco, Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (Aug. 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/CZ6Q-FQZJ. 
128 Michael H. Krimminger, FHFA's Permanent Conservatorship Ignores the 
Law, AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/2PXG-2AKQ. 
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granting the FHFA atypical levels of control.129 As the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia recognized in a related, later 
case, the authority that HERA granted to the FHFA over Fannie and 
Freddie took place during an unprecedented economic downturn and the 
powers granted to the FHFA were unusually broad and encompassing.130 
Thus, the Herron court’s analogy of Fannie and Freddie to any other 
conservatorship or receivership undertaken by the FDIC ignores the 
special facts in this circumstance. 
 There is clear evidence that even in 2008, the conservatorship 
was not temporary. Arguendo, even if the conservatorship was intended 
to be temporary in 2008, it is clear that conditions have developed that 
render the conservatorships indefinite, not “temporary.” This is by the 
FHFA’s own admission. As explored below, as a result of being subject 
to an indefinite conservatorship under the umbrella of the FHFA, the 
GSEs should be deemed state-actors. 
  
IV. WHY AN “INDEFINITE CONSERVATORSHIP” COMPELS THE 
CONCLUSION THAT FANNIE AND FREDDIE ARE ENGAGED IN 
STATE-ACTION 
 This Part argues that there are two reasons why an “indefinite 
conservatorship,” as opposed to a temporary conservatorship, or 
indefinite receivership, compels the conclusion that Fannie and Freddie 
are engaged in state-action. First, as proposed in Section A, a 
conservatorship can be analogized with a principal-agent relationship; a 
principal-agent relationship is a proxy for state-action that the Court has 
articulated on several occasions.131 Second, Section B sets out the 
reasons why “indefiniteness” also points toward finding that Fannie and 
Freddie are engaged in state-action. Taken together, then, an “indefinite 
                                                          
129 The FHFA replaced the GSEs’ boards, purchased nearly 80% of the stock 
and guaranteed the liquidity of mortgages that had been rubber-stamped by the 
GSEs. See FHFA Dir., Statement of FHFA Dir. James B. Lockhart at News 
Conference Announcing Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
(Sept. 7, 2008), https://perma.cc/D96Q-3AE9 
130 See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 225 (D.D.C. 2014). The 
Perry case is also important because it consistently distinguishes between 
conservatorship and receivership, noting quite explicitly that the FHFA is a 
conservator, not a receiver, of the GSEs. See id. at 227. The Perry court then 
goes on to note the subtle but important distinctions between receivership duties 
and conservatorship duties. See id. at 227-28.  
131 See e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013); see also 
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990). 
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conservatorship,” fusing both of these arguments, mandates the 
conclusion that Fannie and Freddie are undertaking state-action.  
A. Conservatorship Embodies Agency Concepts, 
Which is a Proxy for State-Action 
 The state-action answer shifts depending on whether the FHFA 
is described as a conservator or a receiver of Fannie and Freddie. 
Conservatorship imports a principal-agent relationship. A finding of a 
principal-agent relationship necessarily renders a finding of state-action 
on behalf of Fannie and Freddie.    
 It helps to visualize the distinction. A receiver “steps into the 
shoes” of a target company. That is, the receiver merges with the 
company. The two entities are viewed as one. The receiver owes 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders directly.132  
 A conservator, by contrast, is more accurately characterized as 
being in a separate, bilateral relationship with the target company. The 
conservator owes duties to the company, and the company owes duties to 
the shareholders, respectively. This is one reason why the Third 
Amendment to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement has been so 
contentious.133 By requiring Fannie and Freddie to pay a quarterly 
dividend to the Treasury equal to the entire net worth of each entity, 
there is an implicit recognition that the government and the GSEs are not 
one of the same—they exist separately from one another.134 The 
existence of two distinct entities135 brings up questions of agency law. 
 In terms of agency law, it is helpful to think of the government, 
acting through the FHFA, as the principal, and Fannie or Freddie as the 
agent. Fannie and Freddie act on behalf of the conservator, subject to the 
conservator’s right of control.136 Fannie and Freddie’s actions are done at 
                                                          
132 See Roisman, Protecting Homeowners, supra note 7, at 176-77. 
133 Several institutional investors filed suit immediately after the amendments 
were implemented. See Robert Terra & Tony Fratto, Fannie, Freddie Investors 
File Suit Challenging U.S. Treasury's 2012 "Sweep Amendment" GIBSON DUNN 
& CRUTCHER 1, 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/ZNF3-CGNG. 
134 Perry Capital LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 217-18.  
135 A statement made by Clayton S. Rose, a director of Freddie, highlighted the 
distinctness of the entities when he noted that Freddie Mac owed primary duties 
to the FHFA, not to Freddie’s shareholders. Michael J. De La Merced, Freddie 
Official Says He Has No Duty to Shareholders, THE N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Feb. 9, 2011), https://perma.cc/QK7K-257L. 
136 Right of control is a central component of agency law. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f (1)(2006) (“An essential element of agency is 
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the behest of the FHFA, and there is little doubt that the FHFA directly 
controls the manner and means by which Fannie and Freddie accomplish 
their directives .137 The FHFA dictates the management of both Fannie 
and Freddie, stating by its own admission that “[u]nder conservatorship, 
FHFA is responsible for the overall management of both institutions.”138  
It is widely recognized that an agent owes the principal a menu of 
fiduciary duties, such as loyalty, accounting for profits arising out of 
agency139 and a duty of care, among others.140 Freddie Mac effectively 
admitted that they owed fiduciary duties running upwards to the FHFA, 
stating on an investor call in 2011 that “[a]s a legal matter, our 
responsibilities and our duties run to the conservator here.”141 
 There is another way that the conservatorship plays a role in 
bringing Fannie and Freddie under the government’s control. The 
government’s warrant to purchase 79.9% of Fannie’s or Freddie’s stock 
brings with it dominant-shareholder type fiduciary obligations.142 
Fiduciary143obligations impart a responsibility on the part of the fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                  
the principal's right to control the agent's actions.”).  
137 Such control can be demonstrated by indirect indicia and circumstantial 
evidence. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 
(Minn. 1981) (citing Rausch v. Aronson, 1 N.W.2d 371 (1941)). In Fannie and 
Freddie’s case, control of the board and its position as controlling shareholder 
certainly satisfies any notions of “control and influence.” Id.; see also FED. 
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, STRATEGIC PLAN 2009-2014 1, 21, https://perma.cc/8EDT-
2RHF 
138 See id. 
139 See, e.g., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, THIRD AMENDMENT TO AMENDED AND 
RESTATED SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2012) (entitling 
the government to 100% of Fannie’s and Freddie’s profits); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 388 (1958) (“[A]n agent who makes a profit 
in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is 
under a duty to give such profit to the principal.”). 
140 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“[A] 
paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with standard care and with 
the skill which is standard.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 
387 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“[A]n agent is subject to a duty to his principal to 
act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his 
agency.”).  
141 Michael J. De La Merced, Freddie Official Says He Has No Duty to 
Shareholders, THE N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 9, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/QK7K-257L. 
142 See discussion supra Part III.B.2; see also Frequently Asked Questions, 
supra note 89. 
143 Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). (“Someone who is 
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to act in the best interests of the corporation or principal (despite the 
government’s insistence to the contrary144). This stock option was part 
and parcel of the conservatorship.145 This alone is enough to render a 
finding of state-action. In Brentwood Academy,146 eighty-four percent 
membership plus control of the board of directors sufficed for state-
action purposes.147  
 Thus, whether by traditional principal-agent accounts, or via 
dominant shareholder type obligations, the conservatorship relationship 
has helped weave fiduciary duties between the federal government and 
the GSEs. As detailed next, the existence of fiduciary duties is used as a 
proxy for state-action in other areas. 
 In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed a thorny issue of standing 
in Hollingsworth.148 The Court held that in order to satisfy standing, a 
person suing in the shoes of the government had to have a common-law 
agency duty in relationship to the government. 149 That is, the plaintiff 
had to be an agent of the government in order to satisfy the standing 
requirement. This type of requirement is, in many ways, a state-action 
requirement.150 More importantly, the Court endorsed the use of 
                                                                                                                                  
required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope 
of their relationship.”).  
144 Note the following exchange between Clayton S. Rose, a director of Freddie 
Mac, and William A. Ackman, the head of Pershing Square Capital 
Management, during a 2011 earnings call: 
Mr. Ackman: So you can make decisions that are adverse to shareholders? 
Mr. Rose: Correct. 
Mr. Ackman: And there’s no liability to you? 
Mr. Rose: Correct. 
See Michael J. De La Merced, supra note 132. This blatant shunting of obvious 
corporate duties goes to deliberateness, and to the extent of it. 
145 See Frequently Asked Questions: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Sept. 11, 2008) 
https://perma.cc/5DJU-RML5 (“Treasury deliberately chose a large number to 
give confidence to the markets.”). The purchase of the shares, designed to calm 
the markets, was the first step in the FHFA’s plan to return Fannie and Freddie 
to sound and solvent conditions, which is the objective underlying the 
conservatorship. See Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F.Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 
2012).  
146 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 288. 
147 John Dorsett Niles et. al., Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 885, 904 (2011). 
148 See generally Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
149 See id. at 2666.  
150 Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
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fiduciary duties as a way to suss out a principal-agent relationship, 
stating “[p]etitioners are not subject to the control of any principal, and 
they owe no fiduciary obligation to anyone.”151 
 This is precisely the argument that is being advanced here. 
Fannie and Freddie are subject to the control of the FHFA, and owe 
fiduciary duties to them. Under Hollingsworth, state-action is clear and 
unambiguous.  
 Standing doctrine is not alone in using principal-agent 
determinations as a proxy for state-action. Agency law is typically used 
as a proxy for state-action when issues arise under Miranda v. Arizona152 
and its progeny. The state-action question that boils up in this context is 
usually whether an ostensibly private party is a “state-actor” for the 
purposes of administering a Miranda warning. That is, if a private party 
acts as an agent for the state, then such warnings must be given to an 
accused prior to any custodial interrogation.153 
 The factors used in ascertaining whether a private party was 
acting as an agent of law enforcement includes (1) whether the 
government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) 
whether the party performing the search intended to assist law 
enforcement efforts or further his own ends.154 This test, of course, bears 
a strong resemblance to several aspects of the classical definition of what 
constitutes agency—a manifestation of assent from the principal to the 
agent “that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf.”155 Literature on 
this topic supports this point—agency law is often invoked as a primary 
consideration in determining whether private conduct should be 
characterized as state-action.156 
                                                                                                                                  
REV. 585, 588-89 (2016) (citing Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666) (“Citing the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency, the Court [in Hollingsworth] reasoned that 
Proposition 8’s proponents lacked standing because ‘[u]nlike California’s 
attorney general,’ they ‘answer[ed] to no one’ and thus were ‘plainly not agents 
of the State.’ Something more than the meaning of Article III’s ‘Judicial Power’ 
is at stake when the Court finds it necessary to incorporate the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency into standing law.”) 
151 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657.  
152 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
153 See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990). 
154 United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994).  
155 SEE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
156 See, e.g., Kristi North, Comment, Recess is Over: Granting Miranda Rights 
to Students Interrogated Inside School Walls, 62 EMORY L.J. 441, 446-49 (2012) 
(discussing the state-action doctrine); Eleftheria Keans, Student Interrogations 
by School Officials: Out with Agency Law and in with Constitutional Warnings, 
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 However, even Hollingsworth admits that a common law agency 
relationship is a necessary, but not sufficient prerequisite to the finding 
of state-action.157 The Court discussed the crucial aspect of control, 
stating that the ability to elect or remove an officer is an important factor 
in finding state-action for the purposes of standing.158 Thus, the next 
section argues that the concept of “indefiniteness” plays an important 
role in establishing this control—ultimately proving that Fannie and 
Freddie are engaged in state-action.     
B. Indefiniteness Establishes Control and Ultimately 
State-Action 
 The notion that the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie are 
indefinite,159 as opposed to temporary,160 proves that they are engaged in 
state-action. “Indefiniteness” fulfills the second prong of Lebron,161 the 
requirement that the government have “permanent control” over the 
GSEs. This subsection argues that “permanence” and “indefiniteness,” 
despite carrying different connotations, should be understood to set the 
same standard for the state-action inquiry. They are linked together by a 
common thread—whether the activity is conducted pursuant to active 
governmental policy-making.162 Fannie and Freddie are engaged in state-
                                                                                                                                  
27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 375, 383 (2007) (using agency law as a proxy for 
state-action). 
157 A litigant is generally required to show that they have a “direct stake in the 
outcome.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). 
The Court in Hollingsworth then goes on to describe various aspects of agency 
that could qualify one to stand in for the state: elected at regular intervals, 
provisions for removal, existence of fiduciary duties. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2666-67. Thus, the existence of an agency relationship may be required, 
but an agency relationship that only imports fiduciary duties and has no 
elective/removal component to the position may fail the test enunciated in 
Hollingsworth. 
158 See id. at 2666.  
159 See generally Krimminger & Calabria, supra note 99. 
160 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
161 Recall that the second prong of the Lebron test requires that the government 
“retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of that corporation's 
directors.” Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995). 
162 This also functions as a limiting principle. There has been great concern 
when the state-action doctrine is read to effectively cover any state enforcement 
of private conduct. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Scholars of 
different stripes have worried about expansive state-action holdings. See, e.g., 
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action because they are under the policy-making direction of the 
government.  
 The word “permanent” is misleadingly restrictive. No agency in 
the federal government is necessarily permanent.163 Amtrak itself was 
expressly subject to the provision that Congress may repeal, alter or 
amend its chapter at any time.164 In this sense, the “permanence” 
requirement proves too much; it effectively shields almost any regulatory 
agency from state-action.165  
 But there is a concept underlying the “permanence” requirement 
of Lebron that resonates. It is the same concept underlying 
“indefiniteness” in the conservatorship context. Both words imply a 
policy-making role: that there is some active governmental purpose 
behind either “permanent” or “indefinite” control. In this regard, both 
words essentially get at the same principle: state-action includes activity 
that is steered by governmental policy-making, “control,”166 while 
cabining out activity that is not under a policy-making directive. This 
principle limits some of the harsher effects of a strict demarcation line at 
the word “permanent” (which might otherwise exclude “indefinite” 
control), while still keeping the state-action doctrine within structural 
limits.   
                                                                                                                                  
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 152 (The Free Press, 1990) 
(upholding of a private person’s right to eject a guest from her dinner party for 
untoward speech could constitute state-action in violation of the ejected guest’s 
first amendment rights); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 540 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed., 2011) (“Shelley 
remains controversial because ultimately everything can be made state action 
under it.”).   
163 Roisman, supra note 7, at 185. For an excellent discussion of the vacuous-
ness of the permanence requirement, see id. at 185-88.  
164 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 398 (1995) (citing 45 
U.S.C. § 541 (1994)).  
165 This is one of the chief problems with the “permanency” inquiry. It brings in 
almost no agency activity. Roisman, supra note 7, at 185 (“The word 
[permanent] should not be used as a shibboleth to immunize FHFA from 
responsibility for compliance with the Constitution.”). 
166 The Lebron Court goes out of its way to highlight the degree of control the 
government exerted over Amtrak. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390-91 (discussing 
the government’s control of Amtrak’s board of directors). This focus caught the 
eye of the Herron court as well. See also Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 
87, 93 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing the relevance of the fact that the government 
appoints the majority of Fannie’s board of directors).  
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 Looking at the underlying policy is in part compelled by dicta in 
Lebron itself. The Court stated, “[t]he Government exerts its control not 
as a creditor but as a policymaker. . . .”167 To draw a helpful distinction, 
let’s use the example of a “pass-through conservatorship.”168 To 
analogize to the Fannie and Freddie situation, in a pass-through 
conservatorship, the FHFA would not be seeking to preserve Fannie and 
Freddie. Rather, a pass-through conservatorship simply uses the 
conservator, the FHFA, as a bridge between creditors of the entity, and 
the entity itself.169 In this scenario, the federal government is not donning 
its policy-making hat.170 It is acting much more as a facilitator between 
creditors and the underlying company. It isn’t entwined in the 
management of the entity.171 A pass-through conservatorship would thus 
not be involved in state-action because there would be much less policy-
making steering the activities of Fannie and Freddie. In a nutshell, it 
would be passive involvement.  
 Moreover, whether or not the government has a policy-making 
role is moored in other operative areas of the state-action doctrine. For 
example, state-actors, such as agencies, receive what is known as Parker 
immunity, which is a form of immunity from antitrust lawsuits.172 In 
considering whether or not an agency qualifies as a state-actor, and thus 
should receive the benefit of Parker immunity, the first question is 
whether the challenged action is “clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed” as state policy.173 Policy-making in this context is central—it 
is sine qua non to state-action.  
 Thus, the governmental policy underlying the disputed action is 
a crucial consideration in resolving the overarching state-action question. 
As Lebron notes, the objective of the plan matters.174 The objective 
                                                          
167 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399.  
168 See JOHN L. DOUGLAS & RANDALL D. GUYN ET AL., RESTRUCTURING AND 
LIQUIDATION OF U.S. FIN. INST 229, 235-36 (2009), https://perma.cc/KX4F-
QR83. 
169 See id. at 236. 
170 The FHFA is not acting as a “bridge” with Freddie and Fannie. It appoints its 
board, receives 100% of its profits and effectively controls the majority of 
outstanding shares. See Press Release, supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
171 See Douglas & Guyn, supra note 164, at 236 (contrasting pass-through 
conservatorships with the “genuine conservatorships” of Fannie and Freddie). 
172 See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  
173 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97, 105 (1980) (citing New Motor Veh. Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 
U.S. 96, 109 (1978)). 
174 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995). 
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underlying conservatorship is the restoration of Fannie and Freddie to a 
sound and solvent condition.175 It is a policy that contemplates major and 
deliberate federal policy-making. Or in other words, control. This control 
is not theoretical. It has been exercised, by virtue of sweeping 100% of 
Fannie’s and Freddie’s profits into Treasury, by being a dominant 
shareholder, and by appointing a majority of the Board of Directors.176 
Under any sensible understanding of the Lebron doctrine, this must be 
considered state-action.    
V. CONCLUSION 
 As Department of Transportation v. Association of American 
Railroads tells us, one must look at an ostensibly private entity’s de facto 
status, as opposed to relying on peremptory labels.177 Using this lens, is 
clear that Fannie and Freddie are under the conservatorship of the federal 
government, not under receivership.178 It is also clear that the 
conservatorships are far from temporary; they are indefinite.179 Taken in 
sum, these two findings draw a clear contrast with the reasoning used in 
Herron, and support the conclusion that, in their “indefinite 
conservatorship” state, Fannie and Freddie are engaged in state-action.180  
 This conclusion has important ramifications. Fannie and Freddie 
are important tools for the government when deficits are high and 
budgets are tight, as they are off-balance sheet.181 Therefore, one can 
only expect their usage to grow in the coming years.182  
 And yet, to this day, Fannie and Freddie are not considered arms 
of the federal government. As a result, they are free to utilize foreclosure 
procedures that require no notice, a practice that is a blatant abrogation 
of the procedural due process guarantees in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.183  
                                                          
175 See generally Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2012). 
176 See supra note 134 and accompanying discussion.  
177 See Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233 (2015). 
178 See discussion supra Part II.A.  
179 See discussion supra Part II.B.  
180 See discussion supra Part III. 
181 BIGGS & HELMS, supra note 48, at 209. 
182 See John Dalton, There’s Still Time to Fix Fannie and Freddie, HOUSING 
WIRE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/L4UM-XAJA (proposing that the federal 
government create all-encompassing housing vehicles that would control even 
more of the housing market when compared with current day Fannie and 
Freddie).  
183 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 (1970) (stating that the Due 
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 Thousands of homes have or will be foreclosed upon by Fannie, 
Freddie, or servicers acting on their behalf. Recognizing that Fannie and 
Freddie are engaged in state-action would resolve whether they are 
subject to the robust and protective constitutional safeguards that 
celebrate liberty by constraining government.184  
                                                                                                                                  
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires both prior notice and a 
hearing).  
184 Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the 
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 610 
(2010) (“[in the] long run, however, hundreds of thousands of home mortgages 
will have to be foreclosed in spite of these good faith mitigation attempts. It is 
then that the federal interest will be served by a uniform foreclosure process.”).  
31
Goldman: The Indefinite Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is S
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law,
 
 
42 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 17 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol17/iss1/1
